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WEAVING A BROADER TAPESTRY
Mark A. Drumbl*
Charles Jalloh delivers a comprehensive and authoritative survey of the
legacy—in law—of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). Through
compendious research and considerable personal experience, Jalloh tracks
the SCSL’s jurisprudential contributions and legal footprints upon a number
of doctrinal areas: child soldiering, forced marriage, immunities, personal
jurisdiction, and amnesties. Jalloh also examines the SCSL’s interface with
Sierra Leone’s truth commission. Indeed, the SCSL is among the few courts
that coexisted with other justice mechanisms rather than minimize them upon
the transitional landscape.
The SCSL, as Jalloh notes, was a “consensual” institution with a mixed
composition (national and international) that stood somewhat independently.
This curious composition, it seems, served it well. It was a far smaller
institution than its international contemporaries—the ICC, ICTY, and ICTR.1
Unlike its peers, however, there seemed to be something organic about the
SCSL—going back to Jalloh’s “consensual” characterization—which I think
also served it well in its operations and enhanced its contributory energy. This
is of course not to say that the SCSL was not hobbled with concerns that arose
as its work persevered: cultural dissonances,2 an awkward reticence to deal
with violence committed by children,3 tone-deafness in terms of endeavoring
to treat all parties to the conflict equally, accuracies in fact-finding,4 and an
under-inclusive grasp of the harms occasioned by forced marriage5 come to
mind. Jalloh’s exposition of the SCSL’s work is evenhanded and recognizes
these elisions as it identifies the contributions.
*
Class of 1975 Alumni, Professor of Law and Director, Transnational Law Institute, Washington
and Lee University School of Law; Visiting Scholar, Queen’s University Belfast.
1 The International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
2 TIM KELSALL, CULTURE UNDER CROSS-EXAMINATION: INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE (2009).
3 MARK A. DRUMBL, REIMAGINING CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
(2012).
4 NANCY COMBS, FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS: THE UNCERTAIN EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS (2010).
5 Valerie Oosterveld, Forced Marriage and the Special Court for Sierra Leone: Legal Advances
and Conceptual Difficulties, 2 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 127 (2011); Myriam S. Denov &
Mark A. Drumbl, The Many Harms of Forced Marriage: Insights for Law from Ethnography in Northern
Uganda, 18 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 349 (2020).
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In reading Jalloh’s book, I was, however, struck with a bigger picture
observation. This is the dyad of favoritism and neglect. Jalloh himself feels
it and sees it. He notes it: significantly fewer scholarly works have studied
the SCSL than its peer tribunals. Whereas the ICTY had rounds and rounds
of hagiographic legacy conferences following its closure, producing reams of
books and edited collections, the SCSL has not riveted the gaze of
international observers. Jalloh puts it brusquely yet smartly: it is a “forgotten
African tribunal” based in an “uninfluential African state.”6
To me this speaks volumes about the epistemology of international
criminal law—from where do “we” know what we know?—and the
genealogy of international criminal law—from where do “we” trace the
lineage of what we claim to know? And here the overlooking of the SCSL
belies the narrowness of this genealogy and the incompleteness of this
epistemology. The formal and recognized and lauded “sources” of
international criminal law are not representative of the full array of places
and spaces in which justice is sought, stewed, and brewed. A more accurate
historiography of international criminal law would far transcend the
solemnity of The Hague. It would gaze well beyond convenient sites amid
the centers of transnational civil society. For many decades, courts and
commissions and ceremonies have labored creatively and intensely in
scattered, othered spots and dots in the “hinterland.” In thinking about the
history and legacy of international criminal law, it is crucially important to
give these actors their rightful contributory place. To learn from them, so to
speak, so as to center the “other” and to embrace the peripheries. This, too,
is part of the process of decolonizing a discipline.
Jalloh does so with his book on the SCSL. But, truth be told, owing to
its international admixtures, the SCSL receives more attention than those
many actors that, however creative, remain entirely national or local in
composition. The work of the Supreme National Tribunal of Poland, for
example, remains totally overshadowed by Nuremberg-related proceedings
in adjudicating Holocaust atrocity in the imaginary of “where does
international criminal law come from.”7 Utterly marginalized, moreover, are
entities that do not hew to the classic ideal type of what a “courtroom” should
look like and intentionally refuse to transition towards liberal market
capitalism.8
In sum, then, for me one broader takeaway of Jalloh’s book is
methodological in nature. Where should “we” look? With whom should “we”
6
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Mark A. Drumbl, Stepping Beyond Nuremberg’s Halo: The Legacy of the Supreme National
Tribunal of Poland, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 903, 905 (2015).
8 MARCOS ZUNINO, JUSTICE FRAMED (2019).
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engage? Who is the “we”? Does the world really need yet another “qualitative
methods” doctoral dissertation that interviews Hague lawyers at the ICC,
ICTY, and ICTR? That defoliates some other arcane detail of the ICC’s
Rome Statute? Perhaps the time has come to foster a more complete and less
selective epistemology of international criminal law—to recognize that it is
“happening” in far more ways and on many more days. And these happenings
occur in many more places and spaces: to therefore finally give these venues
their due, to diversify foundational and operational narratives, to thin
imagined mythologies and upload actual personalities. Jalloh’s book helps
redress a gap in the literature and rounds out the fullness of international
criminal law’s sources. All the while, this impressive book also points to the
need for much more work and inclusion of many more voices to recognize
international criminal law as truly international.

